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Abstract 
The Turkish health care system has been subject to significant and critical changes 
and reforms since 2003. One of the most important reforms has been implemented 
in 2008 where the Green Card holders are entitled to the same services, without any 
fee, as those with public health insurance, such as the Emekli Sandığı, BAĞKUR, SSK. 
This study initially examines the characteristics of health insurance schemes, 
determinants of holding one of the health insurance schemes (public, private, green 
card, no-insurance) in Turkey. It further analyses the effect of 2008 reform on out of 
pocket expenditures (OOPEs). The study will be the first in the related literature 
analysing the effect of this reform especially on the OOPEs of green card holders. 
The analysis relies on a detailed micro-data level survey, TUİK Household Budget 
Survey, over the period 2002-2011 and employs a difference-in-difference approach 
using a pseudo-panel based on propensity score matching. Initial results show that 
individuals who have public insurance are less inclined to face out-of-pocket health 
expenditures compared to those without health insurance and the Green Card 
holders. However, the difference of the OOPEs between the public health insurees 
and green card holders is reduced after the implementation of the 2008 reform. 
 Keywords: Difference-in-Difference Approach; Health Insurance Schemes; Health Reforms; 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditures; Propensity Score Matching Method; Pseudo-Panel Data; Turkey 
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Özet  
Türkiye sağlık sisteminde 2003 yılından bu yana önemli değişiklikler yaşanmış ve 
anlamlı reformlar yapılmıştır. Bunların en önemlilerinden biri hiçbir ek ödeme talep 
edilmeksizin yeşil kartlıların Emekli Sandığı, BAĞ-KUR, SSK gibi diğer kamusal 
sağlık sigortası yararlanıcıları ile aynı hizmetlerden yararlanmaya başladığı 2008 
reformudur. Bu çalışma öncelikle Türkiye’deki sağlık sigortası planlarının özelliklerini, 
kamusal sigorta, özel sigorta ve yeşil kart sahipliği ile sigortasız olmanın bireyler 
açısından belirleyicilerini incelemektedir. Bunların yanı sıra 2008 reformunun cepten 
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sağlık harcamaları üzerindeki etkisi analiz edilmiştir. Reformun özellikle yeşil 
kartlıların cepten sağlık harcamaları üzerindeki etkisinin analizi ilgili literatürde ilk defa 
bu çalışma ile yer bulacaktır. İlgili analizlerde 2002-2011 dönemini kapsayan TÜİK 
Hanehalkı Bütçe Anketi Mikro Veri Seti kullanılmış ve eğilim skoru eşleştirme 
yöntemiyle oluşturulan sözde panel verilere farkın farkı yöntemi uygulanmıştır. İlk 
bulgular, kamusal sağlık sigortası sahiplerinin yeşli kart sahipleri yada sigortasızlara 
oranla cepten daha az sağlık harcaması yaptıklarını göstermiştir. Bunun yanısıra 2008 
reformu ile birlikte kamusal sigorta sahipleri ile yeşil kartlılar arasında cepten harcama 
farkının azaldığı tespit edilmiştir. 
 Anahtar Kelimeler: Farkın Farkı Yaklaşımı; Sağlık Sigortası Planları; Sağlık Reformları; 
Cepten Sağlık Harcamaları; Eğilim Skoru Eşleştirme Yöntemi; Sözde Panel Veri; Türkiye 
JEL Kodları: I13, I14 
 
Introduction 
Healthcare in many developing countries, including those in Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, is mainly funded and financed through 
out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPEs) by households (Akinci et al., 2014). 
OOPEs is a part of the private health expenditures which includes in-kind 
payments and perks to suppliers of pharmaceutical products, therapeutic 
appliances and other health related goods and services to health practitioners 
with purpose the enhancement of the individuals’ health status (Garg and 
Karan, 2009). An important policy for a country’s health care system is to 
provide financial protection from extreme OOPEs to assure impartial access 
to health care. In the absence of this policy, a household may be forced to 
spend large amounts on medical bills and treatment, and significant part of its 
time to treat and take care of a family member. OOPEs is of major concern 
for the policy makers, because of their multiple consequences to the 
household, the ill family members and the society overall.     
The main impact of OOPEs is the incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditures, defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as exceeding 
the 40 per cent of the household income. This incidence is linked to a 
depraved cycle of poorness because households have to cut their spending on 
other necessities, including food, clothing and children’s education. In 
addition, the impact of OOPEs goes beyond the catastrophic health 
expenditures, where people do not use health services anymore, because they 
cannot afford the direct costs, including the expenses for medicines and 
consultation and the indirect costs, such as transportation (Gottret and 
Scieber, 2006; Anyanwu and Erhijakpar, 2007). Moreover, this has an 
additional impact on poverty and overall a negative effect on a country’s 
growth and development. Therefore, a concern of the policy makers is to 
protect people from financial catastrophic health expenditures. This is the 
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first study which examines the reform of 2008 for Green Card (Yeşil Kart)3 
holders.  The analysis accounts for socio-economic individual and household 
characteristics, such as education, wealth, marital status and area-location of 
the household.  
In 2008, OOPEs were 17.4 per cent of the total expenditure on health 
care in Turkey (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011). However, as a candidate 
country to European Union, the rate was higher than the rest of the EU 
countries, including Germany at 13 per cent, France at 7.6 per cent and United 
Kingdom at 11.2 per cent in the same year (OECD, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
health care system in Turkey has been restructured and has undergone health 
reforms since 2003, promoting the use of technology, delivering a high quality 
of health care, which in turn have affected the OOPEs.  Apparently, the ratio 
was 22 per cent in 2006 and was reduced at 15.4 per cent in 2012, while the 
respective percentage in 2012 was 12.9 per cent, 9 per cent and 7.5 per cent 
for Germany, United Kingdom and France respectively (OECD, 2014). To 
summarise, this study examines the determinants of health insurance schemes 
in Turkey, including socio-economic characteristics, barriers to health care 
access, health insurance coverage and type (social versus private) among 
others. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of the 2008 Turkish Health Reform 
on the OOPEs, between individuals who have public health insurance and 
those who belong in the Green Card program, employing a differences-in-
differences (DID) framework.  
Several studies have explored the OOPEs and have also focused on 
catastrophic health expenditures (Garg and Karan, 2009; Goudge et al., 2009; 
Chuma and Maina 2012; Rahman et al., 2013; da Silva et al., 2015). 
Documenting the determinants of health insurance schemes participation and 
OOPEs and evaluating the specific reform of 2008 can help the policy makers 
and public authorities at achieving universal health coverage, reducing poverty 
and the inequalities in health access. The results show that the gap in health 
expenditures between the public insurees and people participating in the 
Green Card program is reduced.  Findings for a Turkish case study along with 
experiences from examples in other countries may provide guidance for 
policy makers to countries of the MENA region and not only.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a brief description 
of the literature of OOPEs. Section 3 provides a brief description of the 
health reform of 2008. In section 4 we present the methodology, while in 
section 5 we describe the data used in the empirical work. In section 6, the 
empirical results are reported, while section 7 discusses the concluding 
remarks.  
                                                          
3 Green Card is an insurance plan for the poor who were unable to pay for healthcare which is 
provided by government without and fee or contribution. 
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1. Literature Review  
In this section we briefly present the earlier literature related to this study. 
Numerous studies found that pharmaceutical products and medical services 
compose the main sources of OOPEs (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Mugisha 
et al., 2007; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Garg and Karan, 2009). The share of 
those expenses ranges between 25-65 per cent of the total OOPEs in low-
middle income countries (Wagner et al., 2007). Evidence from the literature 
shows that households in Brazil and India spend respectively the 41 per cent 
and 65 per cent of their household income on medicines (Barros and Bertoldi, 
2008; Garg and Karan, 2009), while the share of OOPEs on medicines in 
Burkina Faso and Vietnam  ranges between 80-88 per cent (Mugisha et al, 
2007; Wagstaff, 2007).  Moreover, the largest inequities are reported for low 
income groups, where the poorest households spend proportionally more on 
medicines than the richest families (Wagner et al., 2007). Knaul et al. (2006) 
found that medicines is the most important component of the health 
expenditures regarding the low-income households accounting to almost 50 
per cent of the catastrophic health expenditures in the first quintile (the 
poorest households), while they amount less than 20 per cent in the quintile 
of the richest households. Concluding, health systems that require lower 
OOPEs for health care offer better protection to the poor against 
catastrophic health spending.  
Regarding Turkey, Brown et al. (2012) examined the determinants of 
OOPEs using a Probit binary model during the period 2002-2008.  One of 
the most important findings of their research is that insurance coverage may 
secure households from the risky results of catastrophic health expenditures. 
In this study, we expand the period of analysis over the years 2002-2011, and 
we also take into consideration different insurance schemes.  The amount of 
OOPEs may vary according to insurance type. As Green Card holders 
officially did not have the same benefits as the enrolees in other public health 
insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli Sandığı, BAĞ-KUR) before 20084, it is more 
probably that they were spending more on OOPEs and were more inclined 
to face catastrophic expenditures. Brown et al. (2012) followed Sartori’s 
(2003) approach to solve the selection bias5 problem, while our study employs 
the propensity score matching (PSM) to account for selection bias as an 
alternative approach for causal inference. 
                                                          
4 Prior to 2006, there were three public social security institutions in Turkey SSK (covering 
private sector employees), Emekli Sandığı (covering government employees) and BAĞKUR 
(covering the self-employed). In 2006, the government merged the formal social security 
system under the umbrella of SGK (Social Security Institution). The members of the Green 
Card scheme have officially obtained the same benefits as beneficiaries in other health 
insurance schemes only in 2008 (Erus and Aktakke, 2012; OECD, 2008) 
5 Selection bias problem may occur if poor households prefer do not use or do not seek health 
care because of affordability concerns. 
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Moreover, we analyse and compare the impact of 2008 health reform on 
OOPEs between public health insurees and Green Card holders. Using the 
Household Budget Survey in 2003-2006, Erus and Aktakke (2012) examined 
the impact of the 2003 health reforms on OOPE. The authors found that 
health expenditures are decreased and the impact varies with income level. 
Aran and Hentschel (2012) examined the impact of the Green Card program, 
which was expanded rapidly between 2003 and 2008 when the number of 
Green Card beneficiaries increased nearly four-fold. They explored the 
impact on the protection of healthcare utilization of Turkish people, defined 
by whether individuals decreased the use of preventive and curative care 
facilities and services. The authors found significant effects where Green Card 
holders reduced actually both forms of care. However, our study adds to the 
earlier literature by examining the effects of the 2008 health reform on 
OOPEs for Green Card holders. We apply a Differences-in-Differences 
(DID) analysis considering the periods before and after the 2008 health 
reform, and the macroeconomics shocks of the economic crisis of 2008.     
2. The Health Reform of 2008   
In Turkey the Health Transformation Program (HTP) initially took place 
in 2003. One main characteristic of the HTP is the expansion of the health 
coverage for the Green Card holders. Within HTP, health care services and 
pharmaceutical expenses are covered by the state. Moreover, the policy 
makers incorporated a reduction on VAT that resulted to significant 
discounts of pharmaceutical and medical products and services, and 
consequently reduced the burden for public and citizens. Overall, the HTP 
was successful in terms of health coverage expansion in the whole population, 
and especially the poor people. Furthermore, the HTP reform has 
considerably improved the access to health services and to transportation 
points (Chakraborty, 2009). However, a pre-requisite of the reform 
implementation was the preparation and establishment of a universal health 
insurance law. Within this law, all health insurance schemes were combined 
into one. While it was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
2006, it was not before 2008 that its implementation officially started.  
In addition, HTP has strengthened the preventive health care, mother-
child health care services and the family medicine program. The latter is a 
program which was spread out in the whole country and its purpose is the 
understanding of modern health, such as lifestyle, health diet and others. 
Furthermore, HTP tried to expand the coverage in both formal health sector 
insurance schemes (SSK, Emekli Sandığı and BAĞKUR) and the Green Card 
program. Finally, the Green Card Holders since 2008 enjoy the same benefits 
with the enrolees in other health insurance schemes.  More specifically, the 
contribution to the formal health sector insurance schemes was expanded 
from 59 per cent in 2003 of the population to 69 per cent in 2008, while the 
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number of Green Card beneficiaries was increased from 2.5 million to 9.5 
million over the same period. While previous studies so far analysed the 
effects of 2003 and 2006 reforms, this paper contributes to the earlier 
literature by evaluating the impact of the 2008 reform on OOPEs and 
OOPECTP following a DID framework. 
3. Methodology  
3.1 OOPEs and OOPECTP 
The calculation of the OOPEs and OOPECTP involves the following 
steps (Xu, 2005). First, we calculate the poverty line (PL) and the household 
subsistence spending (SE). More specifically, SE refers to the minimum 
requirement for a household that is necessary to maintain the basic standards 
of living. Various poverty indicators have been developed in the earlier 
literature, but none of them is perfect. This depends on the place, location, 
country and the period of study.  However, following the methodology by Xu 
(2005) we use the food share of the total household expenditures to estimate 
PL. We define PL as the food expenditure share that ranges within the 45th 
and 55th percentile of the total sample. Then the equivalence household scale 
is taken: 
                                    

hh hhsizeeqsize                                                
(1) 
Earlier studies have estimated parameter β using household surveys of 59 
countries, and they found it to be equal at 0.56 (Xu, 2005). The next step is 
to divide the household food expenditure (
hfoodex ) by the equivalent 
household size to get the equivalised food expenditures (eqfoodh): 
                                    h
h
h
eqsize
foodex
eqfood 
                                          
(2) 
Next we take the food expenditure shares over the total household 
expenditure which range between the 45th and 55th percentile across the whole 
sample. We define them as foodex_45 and foodex_55. In the following step, we 
calculate the weighted average of food expenditure in the 45th to 55th 
percentile spectrum. To get the subsistence expenditure per capita we use the 
following formula: 
       
5545 foodex_foodexfoodex_for
w
eqfoodw
PL h
h
hh





         
(3) 
Then the subsistence expenditure (SE) for each household is: 
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                                              hh eqsizePLSE                                      
(4) 
The household is defined as poor when the total household expenditure 
is lower than its subsistence spending (SE): 
                              hhh
hhh
SEpoor
SEpoor


expif
expif
0
1
                                         
(5) 
The next steps involve the calculation of OOPEs. First, we estimate the 
household capacity to pay (CTP) and we define it as a household non-
subsistence spending. We have: 
                      hhhhh
hhhhh
foodexSEfoodexCTP
foodexSESECTP


ifexp
ifexp
                     
(6) 
The out-of-pocket expenditures over the capacity to pay (OOPECTP) are 
defined as the ratio of OOPEs over the CTP and it is: 
                                  h
h
CTP
OOPE
CTPOOPE _
                                      
(7)
 
3.2  Determinants of the OOPECTP 
In the first section we examine the determinants of the health insurance 
schemes. We estimate the following regression:  
  tjhijtjtjhitjhitjhi
TAAγ'yHI ,,,,,,,,,10,,, Z)log(   (8) 
HI denotes the health insurance scheme for the individual i in household 
h, area-location j and in time t. Since the dependent variable is categorical, 
taking four values-public, private, Green Card and no insurance- we make use 
of the multinomial Logit model. The variable log(y) is the logarithm of the 
household income. However, the regression examines also the wealth index, 
which is expressed as a combination of material possession, indicating the 
material deprivation of the household. More specifically, the index is a 
function of household ownership of a number of “goods” such a microwave, 
a television, a car, a video, a freezer, a dishwasher, central heating and second 
house.  Vector Z includes the rest of the explanatory variables, such as gender, 
age, education, marital status, household size, employment status, and others. 
Also, we include in the analysis barriers to health care access, such as the 
difficulties to access the health centres due to the long distance and lack of 
infrastructure and transportation. Set Aj controls for area, θt controls for time-
year of the survey, while AjT is a wave area specific trend which controls for 
time-invariant unobserved characteristics in the area.  
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3.3  Differences-in-Differences (DID) Regression 
One issue in our analysis is the selection bias coming from the self-
selection on health expenditures and the possible heterogeneity between 
individuals who have either social security or not. One candidate model, for 
addressing the selection bias, is the Heckman two-stage procedure. This 
procedure consists of two equations. First, the equation that describes the 
relationship between the outcome of interest yi (i.e. the OOPEs) and a vector 
of covariates Xi, and second, the selection equation, that relates the binary 
participation decision into a health insurance program Di and a vector of 
covariates Zi. However, since Heckman model may present biases (see Elwert 
and Winship for more details on Heckman model and endogenous selection 
bias) we prefer to apply a propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). There are various reasons why we have not estimated the Heckman 
model. First, in the PSM approaches, the assumption of constant additive 
treatment effects across individuals to be held is not required, as is enforced 
in the Heckman selection procedure. In this case, heterogeneous treatment 
effects are allowed and can be retrieved via sub-group analysis. In other 
words, the procedure involves the selection of the main groups of interest 
and then we re-apply the matching procedure within the specific group. This 
shows the flexibility of the PSM for studying and evaluating the effects of 
programs and interventions on groups of particular interest. Another 
important advantage of PSM is that matching algorithms and estimators 
account for the common support problem, as treatment effects can only be 
estimated within the common support. Third, PSM procedures do not require 
functional form assumptions for the outcome equation, because are non-
parametric procedures. On the other hand, regression methods, including 
Heckman model, impose assumptions of the relationship forms which may 
not be always accurate or true. PSM avoids these restrictions and it can be 
useful, because functional forms are not always justified by the data or the 
economic theory (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). The 
DID regression is:  
 
                     
tjhijtjtjhi
tjhi
TAAγ'Z
PostTreatPostTreatOOPE
,,,,,,
321,,, *




             
(9) 
The regression is defined as in (8), while Treat is the treatment variable 
taking value 1 for those who are treated from the reform and 0 otherwise. 
Because the reform of 2008 mainly concerns the poor and disadvantaged 
people, we define as the treated group the Green Card holders. Therefore, 
variable Treat takes value 1 for the Green Card holders and 0 otherwise (public 
health insurance).  Post is the period dummy, taking value 1 if the period refers 
to 2008 and after and 0 for the years before 2008. The interaction term 
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Treat*Post is the DID estimator. A negative and significant sign of the DID 
estimator, implies that the OOPEs are reduced in the treatment group after 
the reform relative to the untreated-control group. Moreover, the data allow 
us to control for the effects of the reform after the economic and financial 
crisis of 2008.   
Since the estimates may suffer from selection bias, the regressions are 
based on a pseudo-panel analysis using propensity score matching and taking 
individual fixed effects on the matched sample. The reason of considering 
matching comes from the fact that those who are eligible for Green Card may 
have significant different characteristics than the individuals and their 
households who have public health insurance. The most important difference 
is the income, since employed and richer individuals are more inclined to 
public health insurance coverage. In addition, the two groups may be different 
prior to the study in other characteristics, including age, marital status, 
education and employment status. For instance, more educated people have 
better opportunities to the labour market and higher earning potentials that 
are associated with higher probabilities of having a health insurance, public 
or private, and therefore, holding a protection against OOPEs. On the 
contrary, unemployed and disabled are more inclined to belong to the low-
income groups and poor social classes that are eligible for the Green Card 
program.  
Matching has become a popular approach for the estimation of treatment 
effects and causal inference. It is widely applied for the evaluation of a variety 
of policies and is used in diverse fields of studies, exploring labour, health and 
environmental policies.  The first problem that arises in many situations, 
including the analysis in this study, is the effect of the health reform of 2008 
on the treated group and the investigation of the difference on the outcomes 
of interest between the treated and the control group. One very common 
approach is to obtain the mean outcome both groups or to apply a DID 
analysis as is the equation (9). However, we regard that there is a selection 
bias problem, as we mentioned earlier, that some individuals are more likely 
to engage in the public health insurance system for various reasons. Thus, the 
matching approach is one possible solution to the selection issue and 
statistical literature shows a close link to the experimental context. The main 
idea is to find a group of non-treated individuals (public health insurance in 
this case) who share similar individual and household characteristics with the 
treated or the participant in the program (the ones who are Green Card 
holders). If this is done efficiently, then the differences in the outcome of 
interest of the selected groups can be attributed to the health reform. 
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3.4  Propensity Score Matching  
The estimated propensity scores of the matching on participants and non 
participants will be p(x)≡P(C=1|x). Rosenbaum und Rubin (1983) show that 
if the Conditional Indepedence Assumption (CIA) holds then: 
                 
   0),(|1),(| 00  CxpyECxpyE                          (10) 
Hence, matching of participants and non participants based on propensity 
scores is sufficient. We use the Mahalanobis algorithm, while other algorithms 
give almost indentical results, including the kernel and the nearest neighbour.  
Nevertheless, we discuss the assumptions of the matching process.  
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA):  The first possible and 
most important identification strategy assumed in the propensity score 
matching is the CIA. This assumption implies that given a set of observable 
covariates X which are not affected by the policy or the treatment, the 
potential outcomes of interest are independent of the treatment assignment. 
In other words, CIA implies that the selection is solely based on the 
observable characteristics and that all the variables influencing the treated or 
policy assignment and the potential outcomes of interest are observed by the 
researcher. For the purpose of this study we assume that the CIA holds. The 
unconfoundedness is: 
                                       
XXDyy ,|, 10                                          
(11) 
Relation (11) implies that the the potential outcomes are indepedent from 
the treatment assignment given a set of vocariates X. The unconfoundedness 
based on the propensity score can be written as: 
                                     
XXPDyy ),(|, 10                                        
(12)
 
Nevertheless, there are issues and drawbacks using PSM procedures. The 
first is the issue of unobservables that are not included into the matching 
process and into the DID analysis. The second is the assumption that the 
covariates included into the matching process are enough to create 
comparable treated and control groups. However, the majority of the 
econometric models suffer from these issues. For example, there are 
unobservable characteristics in randomized trial experiments and natural 
experiments. These unobservables then may affect the outcomes and the 
efficiency of the matching process. Regarding the second issue, many models 
may not control for various variables, and therefore the regressions may 
present plausible, over-control, confounding and selections biases. 
Common Support: This is another requirement besides the independence, 
which rules out the phenomenon of the perfect predictability of the D given 
a set of covariates X. 
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                                     1)|1(0  XDP                                        
(13) 
Variable choice: Another important element of the matching process refers 
to the inclusion or exclusion of the covariates in the propensity score models. 
According to the CIA, the outcome variable of interest must be independent 
of the treatment conditional on the propensity score. Therefore, the 
implementation of matching requires that the set of the covariates X should 
credibly satisfy this condition. According to Heckman et al. (1997), omitted 
variables can create bias in regression estimates, and only variables that affect 
simultaneously the insurance scheme choice and the outcome variable should 
be added in the regression. The justification of the variables choice in our 
study comes from the fact that these covariates are observed before and after 
the participation and they can influence both outcome and the participation 
in the policy program, which is the Green Card. Age, education level, marital 
and job status and area are some of the variables used into the matching 
process that can influence both OOPEs and the program choice.  
4. Data  
In this study we make use of micro-level data derived from the Turkish 
Household Budget Survey (HBS), available from the Turkish Statistical 
Institute (TUIJ), over the period 2002 -2011. The survey includes rich and 
detailed information for three main groups of variables: variables relating to 
household assets (e.g. type of dwelling owned, ownership of durables and 
transportation vehicles), consumption spending (e.g. food and health 
expenditure), and variables related to individuals (e.g. age, marital status, 
employment status and education among others).  
In table 1 we present the summary statistics for the main variables of 
interest, such as the OOPEs and OOPECTP, health insurance, and for the 
main control variables, including education, marital status and household 
income among others. In panel A of the table 1 the continuous variables are 
shown. We should notice that there are extreme values, regarding household 
income, as it can be seen by the minimum and maximum values. Nevertheless, 
after the PSM procedure the maximum value is reduced at 200,000 TL. The 
majority of the sample has public health insurance at 63.10%, while only 
6.76% is privately insured. A high percentage of the population is Green Card 
holders at 13.24% and the 16.91% has no health insurance. The 64.98 per 
cent of the sample is married followed by the singles at 28.95 per cent. Also, 
we should note that the minimum respondent’s age included in the analysis is 
15 years old.  The majority of the people have completed at maximum the 
primary school, while only the 4.25 per cent has finished a university degree. 
Most of the respondents stated that do not confront limited activities to work 
or to activities they usually do because of mental or physical health problems 
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at 94.74 per cent. We observe that almost the 70 per cent of the sample finds 
the access to health centres and transportation points easy. 
In table 2 we show the associations among the main variables of interest. 
We observe that household income is positively related to both private and 
public health insurance schemes and negatively to Green Card holders and 
no-insured respondents. From table 2 we can conclude that the educated and 
wealthier households are more likely to have either a public of private health 
insurance. Regarding the household size, we observe a negative relationship 
with the education income and the participation in the public or private 
insurance scheme. On the contrary, a positive correlation between the family 
size, the Green Card scheme and no health insurance is illustrated. Similarly, 
we can see that the wealthier households and the more educated people are 
located in the urban areas. Also, the household size is smaller in the urban 
areas. From the above associations we overall conclude that richer, more 
educated people, located in urban areas are more likely to have social security, 
public or private, as usually those areas offer more labour opportunities, 
especially for educated people, and higher earning potentials, expressed by 
the household income. Following the earlier literature (Van Doorslaer et al., 
2007; Mugisha et al., 2007; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Erus and Aktakke, 
2012; Brown et al., 2014) the regressions control for various individual and 
household characteristics, including gender, age, education level, household 
income, marital and job status, occupation industry code, rural versus urban 
area, difficulties in access to transportation points and health centres. These 
controls are useful, since they may cause the capability and the decision of a 
person or household to participate in a specific type of health insurance.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Continuous Variables 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Household 
Income 
16,181.7
6 
18,985.36 110 799,709.1  
OOPE 1,920.35
2 
5,853.015 2.5 59,822  
OOPECTP 0.0385 0.0668 0 0.9303  
Age 39.433 16.560 16 99  
Household 
Size 
2.4575 4.9598 1 16  
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Categorical Variables 
 Male Female    
Gender 48.63 51.37    
 
Public Private Green Card No 
Health 
insurance 
 
Health 
Insurance 
63.09 6.76 13.24 16.91  
 Single Married Widowed/Widowe
r 
Divorced  
Marital Status 28.95 64.98 4.76 1.31  
 Illiterate Literate-
not 
complete
d school 
Primary School Primary 
Educatio
n 
Secondar
y School 
Education 
Level 
11.25 21.94 31.74 8.66 5.74 
 High 
School 
Senior 
High 
School 
College Universit
y 
 
Education 
Level 
10.16 4.19 2.06 4.25  
 Yes No    
Health 
Problems 
5.26 94.74    
 Owner Tenant Lodging Other  
House Tenure 68.26 21.54 1.57 8.64  
 Yes No    
Employed 43.50 56.50    
 Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Easy Very Easy  
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Access to 
Health centres 
7.73 22.88 54.32 15.07  
 Very 
Difficult 
Difficult Easy Very Easy  
Access to 
Transportatio
n Points 
7.10 20.42 55.66 16.82  
 Urban Rural    
Area 65.98 34.02    
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 Public 
Health  
Private 
Health  
Green 
Card  
No 
Health  
Househol
d Income 
Educatio
n 
Househol
d Size 
Private 
Health  
-0.3522*** 
(0.000) 
      
Green 
Card 
Holders 
-0.5107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.000) 
     
No Health  -0.5897*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1762*** 
(0.000) 
    
Household 
Income 
0.0413*** 
(0.000) 
0.0101*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0415*** 
(0.000) 
   
Education  0.2021*** 
(0.000) 
0.0034** 
(0.0432) 
-0.1999*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.0848*** 
(0.0432) 
0.2445*** 
(0.000) 
  
Household 
Size 
-0.3047*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.000) 
0.2402*** 
(0.000) 
0.1999*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0228*** 
(0.000) 
-0.2226*** 
(0.000) 
 
Urban 
Area 
0.1822*** 
(0.000) 
0.0192*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1665*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1006*** 
(0.000) 
0.0991 
(0.000) 
0.1686*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1645** 
(0.000) 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
5. Empirical Results   
5.1 Determinants of Health Insurance Schemes 
In this section we present the empirical results about the determinants of 
the health insurance scheme selection. In table 3 we report the Multinomial 
Logit model (8) estimates choosing as a base reference the public health 
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insurance, since is the most frequent category. Therefore, the coefficients are 
interpreted as probability occurrences of participating in a specific health 
insurance scheme in relation to the base category, which is the public health 
insurance. Gender is not significant regarding the choice between public and 
private, but women are less likely to have no insurance or are less likely to be 
Green Card holders according to columns (2)-(3). This can be explained by 
the fact that even women who are not employed are entitled to public health 
coverage through the employment status of their husbands. Taking the 
exponential of the coefficients we find that the probability that women will 
participate in the Green Card scheme or to non-health insurance is lower by 
0.58-0.60 relative to the males, keeping all the other variables constant. A 
similar interpretation is followed for the remained coefficients. For instance, 
the education coefficients are insignificant for the private insurance, implying 
that the education level between the public and the private health insurees is 
not different. 
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Equations and Determinants of Different 
Types of Health Insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private  Green Card No 
Insurance 
Gender (Female) 0.0358 -0.4623*** -0.4703*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0263) (0.0241) 
Age -0.01834*** -0.0218*** -0.0267*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Logarithm of Household Income - 0.3941*** -0.7882*** -0.4294*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0207) (0.0182) 
Marital Status (Never Married)    
Marital Status-Married  0.1874** -0.4317*** -0.7699*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0387) (0.0333) 
Marital Status-Widowed -0.3787** -0.2462*** -0.9910*** 
 (0.1743) (0.0643) (0.0741) 
 
The Effects of the 2008 Health Reform on Out-of-Pocket Health …  
86 
Marital Status-Divorced 0.4311** 0.3551*** 0.3881*** 
 (0.1852) (0.0899) (0.0711) 
Education Level (reference 
Illiterate)  
   
Education Level-Not completed 
school 
0.1246 
(0.1210) 
-0.4248*** 
(0.0446) 
-0.1214** 
(0.0542) 
    
Education Level-Primary School -0.0034 -0.9758*** -0.0927** 
 (0.0968) (0.0363) (0.0422) 
Education Level-Primary 
Education 
0.0031 -1.3827*** -0.7979*** 
 (0.1303) (0.0535) (0.0555) 
Education Level-Secondary School -0.0219 -1.2864*** -0.1553*** 
 (0.1356) (0.0617) (0.0576) 
Education Level-High School  0.1870 -1.5654*** -0.2846*** 
 (0.1256) (0.0608) (0.0541) 
Education Level-Senior School -0.1413 -1.9004*** -0.4491*** 
 (0.1447) (0.0756) (0.0595) 
Education Level-College -0.2588 -2.5696*** -0.6321*** 
 (0.1891) (0.1557) (0.0799) 
Education Level-University 0.5348*** -2.9642*** -0.5965*** 
 (0.1332) (0.1711) (0.0727) 
Employed (No) -0.0572 0.2244*** 0.0134 
 (0.0539) (0.0265) (0.0253) 
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Household Size 0.1119*** 0.2622*** 0.1478*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
Wealth -0.1079*** -0.5249*** -0.3189*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0096) (0.0099) 
Table 3 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Equations and Determinants of 
Different Types of Health Insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private  Green Card No Insurance 
Access to Health centres (reference 
very difficult) 
   
Access to Health centres-Difficult 0.0269 -0.1508** 0.0196 
 (0.1501) (0.0614) (0.0641) 
Access to Health centres-Easily -0.0109 -0.0877 0.0087 
 (0.1551) (0.0621) (0.0648) 
Access to Health centres-Very Easily 0.0935 -0.1860*** -0.0707 
 (0.1925) (0.0880) (0.0862) 
Access to Transportation Points 
(reference very difficult) 
   
Access to Transportation Points-
Difficult  
-0.1711 
(0.1531) 
0.0821 
(0.0642) 
-0.1203* 
(0.0659) 
    
Access to Transportation Points-
Easily 
-0.2941* 
(0.1560) 
-0.0141 
(0.0638) 
-0.1237* 
(0.0653) 
    
Access to Transportation Points- -0.4016** -0.0932* -0.1736** 
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Very Easily (0.1932) (0.0471) (0.0842) 
    
Urban Area -0.2335*** - 0.2913*** -0.1983*** 
 (0.0591) (0.0286) (0.0269) 
Observations 113,458 
Wald chi square 19,957.26  
[0.000] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
On the other hand, the education coefficients are significant and negative 
in the case of Green Card and no-insurance and the relationship is 
monotonic. This indicates that more educated people are less likely to be 
uninsured or to participate in the Green Card scheme relative to the illiterate 
people. The same holds for the wealthier households, and the households that 
are located in urban areas and their access to health services and 
transportation points is easy. The latter can be explained by its 
interrelationship with urban area where generally the access is easier and there 
is a variety of health supply options. We observe a negative relationship for 
the widowed, while a positive relationship is shown for the divorced people, 
implying that are more likely to choose the private, Green Card scheme or be 
uninsured than the reference category, which is the singles. Nevertheless, 
there is a strong heterogeneity among the samples examined as it was 
expected. We derive the same conclusion for the household size. Regarding 
the employment status we see that is significant only in the case of the Green 
Card and it is positive. This shows that unemployed people are more likely to 
belong to the Green cad scheme compared with the employed. The results 
overall are consistent with the study by Brown et al. (2014); however our 
analysis is expanded in such a way that we explore all the health insurance 
types, including the accessibility to health centres and transportation and 
wealth. Moreover, we extend our analysis using a DID approach to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the health reform of 2008. We considered various 
algorithms, including kernel and nearest neighbour, and the results remain 
robust. In this study the matched sample employed has been derived by the 
Mahalanobis metric algorithm. 
In table 4 we present the average Treatment Effects on OOPEs and 
OOPECTP using the matched sample after the PSM procedure. We observe 
that while married individuals and wealthier households spend more on 
OOPEs, expressed by the household income and wealth index, they spend 
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less on OOPECTP, indicating that have more capacity and capabilities to 
afford the health related expenses. On the other hand, widowed and divorced 
spend on average more on OOPECTP, showing that are more vulnerable 
groups than married and singles and they need more attention and protection 
against health related costs. The education is insignificant regarding the 
regression of OOPE, but it becomes negative and significant in the case of 
OOPECTP and it illustrates a monotonic relationship. This is in line with the 
wealth, where more educated people have more earning potentials than 
uneducated and poorer social groups.  
The same holds for the unemployed individuals, who spend more on both 
OOPEs and OOPECTP. Green Card holders overall pay more on both 
OOPEs and OOPECTP than the public health insurees over the period we 
examine.  In table 5, the average effects of other health insurance scheme 
groups are reported.  The results show that those who have a private health 
insurance spend on average 14 Turkish Liras (TL) more than those with 
public health coverage, while those without health insurance coverage pay on 
average 6 TL more than the respondents who have either public or private 
health insurance.  
In addition, the OOPECTP levels are higher for uninsured people. On 
the other hand, the Green Card holders spend lower amounts on OOPECTP 
than the uninsured respondents by 12.5 TL.  We should notice that we do not 
show the estimated coefficients for the rest of the socio-economic factors, as 
we presented them in table 4, because the conclusions remain the same.  
Table 4. Propensity Score and Average Treatment Effects on Health 
Expenditures and OOPECTP for Green Card and Public Health 
Insurance  
VARIABLES (1) 
OOPEs 
(2) 
OOPECTP 
Dummy-Green Card Vs Public 14.662*** 0.0057*** 
 (4.708) (0.0017) 
Gender (Female) 0.1934 0.0064*** 
 (0.1626) (0.0010) 
Age 0.1331* 0.0009 
 (0.0563) (0.0031) 
Logarithm of Household Income 10.302*** -0.0032** 
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 (1.806) (0.0015) 
Marital Status (Never Married)   
Marital Status-Married  6.4621* -0.4317*** 
 (3.788) (0.0387) 
Marital Status-Widowed 5.6931 0.0137*** 
 (6.012) (0.0025) 
Marital Status-Divorced 21.675** 0.0168** 
 (10.1852) (0.0076) 
Education Level (reference Illiterate)    
Education Level-Not completed school 3.6112 -0.0096 
 (3.088) (0.0381) 
Education Level-Primary School 0.2839 -0.0018 
 (4.077) (0.0056) 
Education Level-Primary Education 3.7775 -0.0045 
 (6.288) (0.0051) 
Education Level-Secondary School -3.9010 -0.0102** 
 (5.408) (0.0043) 
Education Level-High School  1.5753 -0.0131*** 
 (7.783) (0.0021) 
Education Level-Senior School -5.5282 -0.0173*** 
 (6.997) (0.0028) 
Education Level-College 1.9397 -0.0078* 
 (5.748) (0.0043) 
Education Level-University 2.5914 -0.0183*** 
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 (4.479) (0.0048) 
Employed (No) 2.6522** 0.0023** 
 (1.325) (0.0011) 
Household Size 0.6865*** 0.0009 
 (0.1808) (0.0014) 
Wealth 1.4566*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.3470) (0.0004) 
Urban Area -2.1622*** - 0.0074** 
 (0.0591) (0.0033) 
Observations 20,163 20,163 
R Square 0.1033  0.1061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5. Propensity Score and Average Treatment Effects on                                                                 
OOPEs and OOPECTP for other Types of Health Insurance 
VARIABLES OOPEs OOPECT
P 
Green Card Vs Public 14.662*** 0.0057*** 
 (4.708) (0.0017) 
 
No-Insurance Vs Public-
Private 
 
6.6725*** 
 
0.0039*** 
 (1.141) (0.0008) 
 
Green Card Vs No-Insurance 
 
-12.409*** 
 
-0.0063*** 
 (2.191) (0.0016) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
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In table 6 the test of the propensity score matching considering various 
health insurance classes are reported. In the majority of the estimates the 
groups share similar characteristics. However, the marital status is 
significantly different among the groups examined, except for the Green Card 
holders versus those with no health insurance. Other differences include the 
education level in the no insurance versus private-public groups and the urban 
area in the no insurance versus Green Card groups. The propensity score 
matching results follow the CIA, as we discussed earlier in the methodology 
section and it is based on the observable variables. However, we should note 
that the matching process is associated with drawbacks, since the individuals-
agents may choose the insurance type based on unobservable characteristics 
like trust, quality of family support, relations and togetherness and the 
individual and family medical history, which information is not available in 
the survey. Nevertheless, the estimates are not significantly different with the 
unmatched sample, as the analysis is relied on a quasi-experimental approach, 
which is the health reform of 2008. Moreover, this approach along with the 
randomized trial experiments and the natural experiments present the 
common problems related to the difficulty of accounting also for 
unobservable characteristics. 
Table 6. Test for Propensity Score before and After Matching 
 Green Card Vs 
Public 
No Insurance Vs 
Public-Private 
Green Card Vs 
No-Insurance 
Gender 0.66 
(0.507) 
1.33   
(0.184) 
-0.86   
(0.391) 
Age -1.17 
(0.244) 
1.54   
(0.115) 
-1.51   
(0.123) 
Household 
Income 
-0.44 
(0.662) 
1.30   
(0.172) 
0.91   
(0.361) 
Marital 
Status 
-1.99* 
(0.092) 
-1.79*  
(0.073) 
-5.25   
(0.000) 
Education 
level 
1.43 
(0.112) 
1.76**  
(0.081) 
-0.34   
(0.731) 
Employed -2.42** 
(0.024) 
-1.36   
(0.173) 
-0.31   
(0.759) 
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Household 
Size 
0.92 
(0.355) 
2.23   
(0.026) 
-1.61   
(0.108) 
Wealth 0.34  
 (0.732) 
1.02   
(0.293) 
-1.57   
(0.113) 
Urban area -0.96   
(0.338) 
1.17  
(0.266) 
2.00** 
(0.045) 
Standard Errors in parentheses, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.2 Differences-in-Differences (DID) on Health Reforms 
In this section, we show the estimates of the DID framework which is 
applied to evaluate the effects of 2008 health reform. The treatment group is 
the Green Card holders, while the control group includes those who have 
public health insurance. We should note that those who are uninsured or have 
private health coverage are not included, because the health reform in 2008 
refers to changes that are applied to Green Card holders, who are entitled to 
the same services and benefits with those who have public health insurance 
coverage (OECD, 2008). In panels A and B of table 7 we report the DID 
estimates respectively for the OOPECTP and OOPEs. In both cases, the 
results show that there is no difference between the treated and control group. 
While the OOPEs increased after 2007, a decrease in OOPECTP is recorded. 
Overall, an increase on health expenditures may mark a risk, but the increase 
of OOPECTP is more crucial, since it signals the capacity or capability of the 
household to meet the health related costs. In other words, an increase of 
OOPEs does not always imply a risk, as long as, the household is capable to 
meet the expenses. Concluding in both cases, the OOPECTP and OOPEs 
levels between the treated and the control group are reduced due to the health 
reform of 2008. In addition, in panels C and D we present the placebo tests 
for the DID, taking 2007 as the placebo year, implying that our estimates are 
robust, since the DID coefficient is insignificant. The same conclusions are 
derived if we set up 2006 or another year as placebo.  
Table 7. DID for OOPECTP and OOPEs and various cases 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green Card 
Vs Public Health 
and OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green 
Card Vs Public 
Health and 
OOPEs 
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Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0106 
(0.507) 
Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public1) 
Health Insurance 
19.944  
(17.002) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2008 and after) 
-0.0783*** 
(0.0150) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2008 and after) 
27.540**  
(13.292) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0294** 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -34.691**  
(19.377) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.1305 R Square 0.1427 
Panel C: Green Card 
Vs Public Health  
Placebo OOPECTP 
test 2007 
 Panel D: Green 
Card Vs Public 
Health  Placebo 
OOPEs test 2007 
 
Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0043 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public) 
Health Insurance 
22.571   
(21.533) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2007 and after) 
-0.0431*** 
(0.0113) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2008 and after) 
30.700  
(25.445) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.0058 
(0.0142) 
Treat*Post-Period -27.972  
(22.842) 
No. Observations 20,555 No. Observations 20,555 
R Square 0.0834 R Square 0.0729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
  
In figures 1-2 we illustrate the parallel trend assumption respectively for 
OOPEs and OOPECTP. The figures confirm our estimates. For instance, we 
saw an increasing trend for OOPEs after 2007 which is suggested by the line 
for the control group which is increasing after 2007. However, as we can 
observe in figure 2, the OOPECTP actually decrease, especially in the treated 
group.  
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Table 8. DID for Logarithms of OOPECTP and OOPEs 
 Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Green 
Card Vs Public 
Health and 
OOPECTP 
 Panel B: Green Card 
Vs Public Health 
and OOPEs 
 
Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public 
Health Insurance) 
0.0446 
(0.106) 
Treat (1 for Green 
Card, 0 for Public1) 
Health Insurance 
0.1670 
(0.212) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2008 and after) 
-0.1082*** 
(0.0310) 
Post-Period (1 for 
2008 and after) 
0.7074*  
(0.378) 
Treat*Post-Period  -0.2129** 
(0.0982) 
Treat*Post-Period -0.2602**  
(0.130) 
No. Observations 19,798 No. Observations 19,798 
R Square 0.1266 R Square 0.8773 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 1. Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPEs 
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Figure 2. Parallel Trend Assumption for OOPECTP 
 
Figure 3. Histogram for OOPEs 
 
 
In figure 3 we present the histogram for the OOPEs. It becomes obvious 
that the distribution is skewed, while the histogram for the logarithm of the 
OOPEs is presented in figure 4. Similarly, the same conclusion is derived by 
the figures 5-6 for the OOPEs over the capacity to pay. For this reason we 
re-estimate the DID regressions are considering the dependent variables in 
logarithms. In table 8 we report the DID estimates for the OOPECTP and 
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OOPEs. Based on the DID coefficient in both cases the difference in the 
OOPECTP and OOPEs between the treated and control group is reduced 
respectively by 21 and 26 per cent. 
Figure 4. Histogram for Logarithm of OOPEs 
 
Figure 5. Histogram for OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
 
Figure 6. Histogram for the Logarithm of OOPEs over the Capacity to Pay 
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However, we should notice that the study undergoes from major 
drawbacks. The first and more important disadvantage is the use of repeated 
cross-sectional data, where we are unable to follow the same individuals and 
households across time and therefore, this limitation does not allow us to 
include their history into a fixed effects model. Even thought, panel data 
models suffer more from attrition and non-response issues, relative to the 
cross-sectional surveys, still we cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity 
within and between the respondents. Second, PSM procedures rely on certain 
and strict assumptions, that we discussed earlier in the methodology section, 
which may not always hold.   
Conclusions  
The first aim of this study was to explore the most important factors that 
determine individuals’ and households’ capability of participating in a specific 
health insurance scheme. Second, we have examined the effects of the health 
insurance types on OOPEs and OOPECTP. The findings show that in all 
cases, public health insurance offers a protection to the households regarding 
the OOPEs. In addition, those who are Green Card holders spend less on 
OOPEs in comparison with the uninsured people. Next, the study have 
explored the effects of the health reform in 2008, where Green Card holders 
are entitled to the same health services and benefits with the public health 
insurees. In addition, after 2008 there have been significant improvements on 
the infrastructure of health centres and a large expansion of the emergency 
services in the rural areas (OECD, 2008). The findings show that the health 
expenditures between the treated group-the Green Card holders- and the 
control group –public health insurance- are reduced. This indicates that the 
expansion of the Green Card scheme in 2008 was a successful policy that has 
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reduced the gap in the health expenditures. The results also illustrate that 
besides the socio-economic characteristics that were examined in previous 
studies, such as age, employment and income among others, the accessibility 
level to health centres and transportation points is another critical factor. 
Since many people need a private transportation, when the accessibility to 
public transportation is difficult or inconvenient, and the distance to health 
centres and their accessibility level is low, the OOPEs are likely higher. Future 
research studies may explore the impact of the 2008 health reform on other 
outcomes, such as health status, standard of livings and well-being 
considering a group analysis, including gender, disabled and age groups.   
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